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Abstract
What is the Specious Present? Which is its duration? And why, ulti-
mately, do we need it to figure in our phenomenological account of 
temporal perception? In this paper, after introducing the role of the 
Specious Present in the main models that account for our phenom-
enological present, and after considering the deflationary objection by 
Dennett (that the debate relies on the fallacy of the Cartesian Theatre 
of Mind, the idea that it is meaningful to ask where and when an expe-
rience becomes conscious), I claim—thanks to a spatial analogy—that 
there could be a good criterion to distinguish between a present ex-
perience and a past experience, that there are good reasons to sustain 
the Specious Present (while snapshots are in no sense part of our phe-
nomenological life), and that there could be a precise way to define the 
nature—and to measure the duration—of the Specious Present; as I 
will clarify, our capability and possibility to act and react are central 
in this perspective. If we accept this change of perspective, there is a 
definite sense in which the Specious Present is part of our temporal 
phenomenology.
Keywords
Philosophy of time, temporal experience, specious present, co-
consciousness, experiential now.
1 Introduction
Thomas Reid, underlining the contradiction between strict philo-
sophical truths and common sense, claimed that in our ordinary 
life we allow ‘the present’ to indicate a duration, rather than—as 
it should be—a point-like moment. In any duration there is a before 
and an after; strictly speaking, then, the present is durationless—
otherwise it would contain some past elements and some future ele-
Andrea Roselli120
ments. However, this line of reasoning was not able, in the opinion 
of the American philosopher and psychologist William James, to cap-
ture our immediate experience of change, persistence and motion. 
James wanted to differentiate what he meant by ‘present’ from this 
objective, mathematical description of a point on the temporal line. 
Absorbing the results of the experimental psychology done in Ger-
many in the second half of the 19th Century, and framing it in terms 
of a philosophical idea that he himself credited to E. R. Clay, James 
made very famous the claim that the phenomenological now is not 
point-like, but extends over an interval of time. He had in mind a phe-
nomenological present, a duration which is perceived both as present and 
as temporally extended. This phenomenological present is ‘specious’ 
in that, unlike the objective present Reid had in mind, it is an interval 
and not a durationless instant. There is a sense, then, in which all the 
contents of a Specious Present possess a sort of phenomenal presence; 
the aim of the present paper is to better specify this sense.
2 Which phenomenological present?
There is a preliminary, methodological issue: we must specify which 
phenomenological present we are referring to—the period of time 
to which we have a vivid cognitive access, or the (much shorter) 
window through which we are directly aware of change? In the rel-
evant literature we find a lot of estimated different durations for the 
Specious Present, from 300milliseconds to 12seconds; such an in-
credible difference could be explained only by admitting that not 
everyone is speaking of the same thing. James for example, although 
mentioning the time lapse necessary to hear two auditory stimuli 
in succession, chose to characterize the Specious Present as “the 
maximal extent of our immediate distinct consciousness for succes-
sive impressions” (James 1890: 612)—which is approximately 12 
seconds, as he learned from the German physician, physiologist and 
experimental psychologist Wilhelm Wundt. Wundt’s experiments 
were meant to measure the capability to recall accurately an auditory 
sequence, something which is manifestly different from the direct 
experience of motion. James, then, thought of the Specious Present 
as the period of time to which we have a vivid cognitive access, while 
in the second part of the 20th Century a narrower meaning started 
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to settle, attesting the duration of the Specious Present around 2/3 
seconds.
One of the most influential figures, in this sense, is Ernst Pöp-
pel. Studying the reproduction of visual and auditory stimuli of dif-
ferent durations, Pöppel observed a mechanism which appeared to 
integrate successive events within a temporal window of approxi-
mately 2 to 3 seconds; subjects typically mentally structure auditory 
sequences, experiencing successive beats as a unit; but “it turns out 
that two beats cannot lie further apart than 2 to 3 seconds to allow 
subjective accentuation. Beyond this interval, it is no longer possible 
to mentally connect the second to the first beat, i.e., the first beat 
has then already disappeared into a perceptually not directly avail-
able past […]. It is as if the brain asks, ‘What is new in the world?’ 
every 3 seconds or so” (Pöppel 1997: 114); analogously Elzbieta Sz-
elag, analyzing a series of experiments in which sequences of metro-
nome beats at different frequencies have been presented to different 
subjects, commented: “the results indicate an integration process, 
i.e., temporally separated successive beats are mentally connected 
with each other into larger perceptual units […]. It appears that the 
sensory systems can hold information up to the temporal limit of 
approximately 3s” (Szelag 1997: 122). While, however, everyone ad-
mits that these results are meaningful—that 2/3 seconds cycles are 
relevant to our brain processes—nowadays most of the philosophers 
of time tend to think that a much shorter figure is a more plausible 
candidate for the extended feeling of presentness (while in three sec-
onds we typically lose the feeling of direct awareness1).
Such authors (among others: Lockwood 2005, Le Poidevin 2007, 
Strawson 2009, Hoerl 2014, Prosser 2016, Dainton 2017), interpret 
the Specious Present as the maximum duration in which change or 
succession can be experienced as a whole, object of a single mental 
act. If we take the Specious Present to be the window through which 
we are directly aware of change and persistence, then it is plausible 
to suppose that it is of the order of about a second. Even between the 
authors of this ‘third generation’ of the Specious Present, however, 
1 Dainton (2017: 7.1): “Clap your hands three times, leaving about a second 
between each clap; when the third clap takes place, are you still directly aware 
of the first?”
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there are differences2 in the estimates of the duration of it. What 
they are thinking of is the phenomenological immediacy associated 
with our complex perceptions; I am proposing here a model capable 
of establishing a definite meaning for this ‘phenomenological imme-
diacy’ and of avoiding the ‘Cartesian theatre of the mind’ fallacy. 
Before doing that, however, it is crucial to present the main models 
of our temporal phenomenology and to show how the Specious Pres-
ent appears in them. What I mean to show is that every model has a 
story to tell about our phenomenological immediacy and that—if we 
reject the change of perspective I propose here—we don’t have a way 
to choose. The three main accounts of our experience of time and 
presentness are the Cinematic Model, the Retentional Model and the 
Extentional Model.
3 Three models of our temporal phenomenology... plus one
Cinematists reject the idea of a Specious Present. They maintain that 
our temporal phenomenology is a succession of momentary states 
of consciousness. We always know what comes first and what sec-
ond; therefore, the best model to describe our temporal awareness 
is one in which there are momentary states of consciousness (with 
momentary I mean physiologically momentary: about 30ms, time un-
der which we can’t distinguish the order of two stimuli3). Of course, 
it can be argued that our present experience is in fact momentary, 
but there are some reasons that explain why it doesn’t seem so (we 
remember the immediate past, or there is a retention of the immedi-
ate past in the present experience, etc.). Something that is usually 
contested by the opponents of the Cinematic model is that having 
in mind the different positions that an object occupied in time, and 
having the cognitive understanding that it moved, does not coincide 
2 Dainton (2000), for example, opts for half a second or less; Lockwood sug-
gests a second or a second and a half (2005). Strawson goes the other way, and 
suggests a figure of around 300msec (2009): there is not a widespread consense.
3 Stimuli of around 1ms need to be separated from one another by in interval 
of around 30 msec if they are to be perceived as a succession—a result which 
holds across sensory modalities. Stimuli which are separated by shorter intervals 
are not perceived as distinct.
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with directly perceiving it moving.4
It is mainly to save this last intuition that the two other models 
of temporal experience were born. Retentionalism and Extentional-
ism are realists about phenomenal temporality—change, succession 
and persistence can be directly perceived or apprehended.5 Both Ex-
tensional and Retentional theorists agree that a temporal spread of 
contents can be apprehended as a unity. Not only, then, simultane-
ous contents can be experienced together, but even contents that are 
successive; contents which are apprehended as unified in this way 
belong to a single Specious Present. How is it possible, however, to 
perceive an extended present? When we hear three close auditory 
tones, even if we experience the whole musical phrase as present, yet 
we also hear the notes as successive, and therefore as extending over 
an interval. How could a succession of elements also be experienced 
as present? Retentionalist and Extentionalist, while accepting both 
the idea of a Specious Present, give different accounts of this appar-
ent paradox.
Retentionalists agree that our experiences occur within episodes 
of consciousness which lack an objective, clock-time extension,6 but 
these episodes, they maintain, are composed by an immediate ex-
perience and a representation (or retention) of the recent past; the 
result is that the contents of these experiences represent temporally 
extended intervals. The stream of consciousness, then, is composed 
of succession of momentary states—just as the Cinematists claim; 
the difference is that the experience of these momentary states is one 
of duration. The confinement to a momentary present is seen by Re-
tentionalists as a condition for contents to be experienced together; 
phenomenal unity needs the simultaneous presentation of contents 
4 Obviously enough, many refined arguments have been put forward by Cin-
ematists to defend their position. All I’m trying to do here, however, is to pres-
ent the main models of our temporal phenomenology to show how the Specious 
Present is present in them.
5 There is the possibility to build a ‘Cinematist Realist’ model, but virtually 
every philosopher of time who defends Cinematism is an Anti-realist about phe-
nomenal temporality.
6 There obviously are some border-line accounts (see for example Lee 2014), 
but I am here presenting the position in the most general and neutral way possible.
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to a single momentary awareness. James himself—in the Principles, 
at least—seems to subscribe this way of thinking of the Specious 
Present: a temporal window which does not extend over an interval 
of objective time; Retentionalist’s Specious Present possesses only an 
experienced extension. A distinction is usually drawn between the 
content and the vehicle of a representation: the former is that which is 
being represented, the latter is the entity which carries the repre-
sentation; experiences can represent temporal features, but they also 
themselves possess temporal features.7 The temporal properties of 
the objects we perceive, in fact, need not coincide with the temporal 
properties of the presentations (episodes of awareness) in which we 
apprehend them; the properties of a representation (that which is 
doing the representing) and the content of that representation (what 
is represented) can differ dramatically. Objects which are objectively 
past can be presented in our present experience; there is no obvious 
reason why the temporal properties of a mental representation need 
to entirely coincide with the temporal properties of the content car-
ried by it.
Retentionalists, however, are sometimes accused to have invent-
ed “nothing but a new word”, as Dainton (2000: 155) puts it: what is 
a retention, and in what differs from a memory? The standard answer 
is that we can think of retentions as past-directed mental representa-
tions, automatically associated with every experience; unlike memo-
ries, they do not unfold over time, and they are more vivid than ordi-
nary memories. Modal Retentionalists, such as Husserl and Brentano 
(at least in his later writings), argue that there are temporal modes 
of consciousness—objects can be apprehended as past to differing 
degrees; contents appear under different ‘temporal modes of presen-
tation’, some fully-present, other ‘past’, other ‘more past’, and so on. 
Non-Modal Retentionalists, on the other hand, maintain that all the 
7 Divergences about the content / vehicle distinction lie at the heart of the 
debate between Extensionalists and Retentionalists. Retentionalists believe that 
experiences which present us with succession are able to disguise their true tem-
poral properties: a succession of presentations, they claim, can amount to a pre-
sentation of succession only if the contents are presented to a single, momentary 
act of apprehension. The Extensional approach carries no such implications: on 
this view, a Specious Present present is itself temporally extended. Here vehicle 
and content have the same temporal properties.
125How Long is Now?
contents within a Specious Present appear equally present—the only 
difference with Extentionalists being the relationship with clock-
time. Both versions encounter some possible objections: Non-Modal 
Retentionalists lack a convincing way to describe the uniqueness and 
distinctiveness of our experiences, it seems we should hear the same 
notes many times; Modal Retentionalists, on the other hand, have 
the difficult task to explain, if retentions are unlike immediate expe-
riences, how and why we have direct perceptions of change and mo-
tion—the experience of change would be somehow different from 
that of a shape or a colour.8
Extentionalists claim that the Specious Present is not merely ex-
periential, but extends over clock-time. They hold that the atomic 
unit of our perception is an extended period of time; we have an 
experience of succession because we directly experience the succes-
sion. The Retentionalist doctrine that diachronic phenomenal unity 
can only exist in strictly momentary states of consciousness is re-
jected, in favour of a more ‘natural’ model of temporal awareness. 
Change and persistence are incorporated in our experience in a quite 
straightforward way, since our stream of consciousness is composed 
of a succession of extended chunks of experience. The Extention-
alists’ Specious Present is itself temporally extended, and its parts 
succeed one another in time in just the way they seem to; our ex-
periences extend over a period of real time, in a way which (almost 
infallibly) matches the phenomenal period it presents.
Finally, in the last years another anti-realist alternative to the 
‘Specious Present’ has been put forward. Rather than straightfor-
wardly denying that we directly experience motion, the antirealist 
stance is made more plausible by a credible explanation as to why 
we believe we experience motion (and more generally, change) if 
in fact we do not. This improved version of the Cinematic model, 
suggested in particular by Prosser (2016), is the Dynamic Snapshot 
Theory. In particular, it is claimed that motion can be directly expe-
rienced despite the unextendedness of the atomic content of our ex-
perience. It is true that experience consists of a series of perceptual 
snapshots, one after the other (note that this could be a continuous 
8 Again: there are many good arguments in defence of these claims, but it is 
not necessary to mention them here.
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series—we don’t have to imagine experience as fragmented into 
countable snapshots); these snapshots, however, are not bound to be 
static, since even if experience has an instantaneous content, it isn’t 
true—it is argued—that this cannot include something that can be 
detected over a non-instantaneous interval. The Dynamic Snapshot 
Theory posits a vector-like feature that durationless contents could 
possess; even an instantaneous experience could contain vector rates 
of change, being then an immobile experience of something moving. 
Even if it is technically true that the atomic content of our experi-
ence (again: around 30ms, the threshold for a definite experience9) 
is a snapshot, that doesn’t mean that that content has to be static. 
Extended processes, then, have instantaneous parts, even if the na-
ture of such parts depends on what occurs at other time. Consider 
Prosser (2017):
‘Moving’ is a state that something can be in at an instant, even though 
it can only be in that state by virtue of being in other places at other 
times. (Prosser 2017: 150)
It would, of course, take time for the brain to detect motion, for example 
by comparing patterns of retinal stimulation at different times. But it 
clearly does not follow from this that the resulting experience must have 
a temporally extended content. The necessary properties of the stimulus 
can differ from those of the resulting experience. (Prosser 2017: 153)
When we have an experience of motion, we are in a state that has a 
representational content that determines the character of the experi-
ence: put it simply, when we have a visual experience of a car going 
at 50mph, we don’t only see different photographs (static snapshots); 
the acquisition of the last snapshots define an experience of motion, 
so that in every snapshot we see, so to speak, a photograph of a car 
moving; our memory integrates the visual experience with the crucial 
vector of motion. Even in this model, then, for there to be a ‘dy-
namic snapshot’ there must be some kind of retention of information; 
something must tell us that motion is painted on the present snapshot.
9 See for example Wittmann (2011). Technically, then, even our point-like 
experience is extended, but we can understand in what sense it is a snapshot: it is 
like a photography in which the shutter remains open for 30ms; everything that 
happens in that window of time is simultaneous for us.
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At this point, one could start doubting that there is a genuine de-
bate between the models. How is our phenomenological introspec-
tion supposed to give support to one or the other model if every 
model have the same capability to distinguish between different kind 
of experiences—simply, with different names? I agree with Prosser 
(2016: 136): “it is not really clear that we must choose between a the-
ory that combines instantaneous contents with a short-term memory 
and a theory according to which there is a short-lived Specious Pres-
ent”. Will we be ever able to understand if our visual experience of 
a car going at 50mph results either from a comparison between the 
last snapshot and the preceding snapshots (short-term memory), or 
from an extended experience, or from a retention of the past experi-
ences? But even more radically: is there a difference at all?
It seems that all the models tell the same story about informa-
tion processing; some preceding data must be combined with the 
last acquired data in order to produce our experience of motion. Of 
course, every model has a specific line of defense, but it doesn’t seem 
that any of them contain elements capable of explaining phenomeno-
logical features that the other models can’t; maybe they simply tell 
the same story with different names. As I am going to argue in the 
next section, the fallacy of the Cartesian Theatre model of the human 
mind has a central role in this line of reasoning. If this is the case, the 
Specious Present would merely be another name to convey an idea, 
but nothing specific, nothing that we would be able to clearly indi-
viduate in our phenomenology. However, I don’t think that this is 
the case, and I am going to offer an argument to believe that it is not.
4 A difficulty for the phenomenological dispute
Daniel Dennett (1991) argued that, in some cases at least, there is no 
sharp dividing line between memory and experience, and the project 
of trying to ascertain the temporal microstructure of consciousness 
is misconceived. If two stimuli are presented in rapid succession, for 
example, most subjects will be able to identify the second stimulus 
far more reliably than the first. The standard interpretation of this 
sort of experiment, according to Dennett, is that in such cases the 
subject do not experience the first stimulus; they have no visual ex-
perience of it, since the occurrence of the second stimulus somehow 
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interferes with the normal perceptual process. However, there is a 
second possible interpretation of the subject’s responses. Perhaps the 
subjects do experience the first stimulus, but something interferes 
with their memory of this experience, and so when subsequently 
queried they deny having seen it.10 Dennett maintains that in the 
case described (and others like it) neither interpretation is correct; 
there is simply no fact of the matter as to whether or not the subject’s 
experiences the first stimulus: “the boundary between perception 
and memory […] is not perfectly sharp” (Dennett and Kinsbourne 
1992: 192). The assumption that there must be a determinate an-
swer is grounded, in his opinion, in a sort of Cartesian conception 
of experience; according to such a conception, the question ‘what is 
currently appearing on the stage of your consciousness?’ always has a 
fully precise answer, an answer determined by the experiential con-
tents present in the relevant subject’s consciousness. Dennett’s argu-
ments, it has been claimed,11 have a ‘verificationist slant’, relying as 
they do on the principle that if there isn’t evidence that P obtains or 
not, there is not fact of the matter as to whether or not P obtains. In 
my opinion, however, the argument is—more radically—that there 
simply is not a point at which external data become a conscious ex-
perience, or a conscious experience becomes a memory; it is not only 
difficult to discover – there is not such a region in our brain.
Inspired by Dennett’s argument, Simon Prosser (2016) argued 
that the differences between the models of our temporal experience 
seem to concern the point at which external data become conscious12 
—where to put the line between memory and present conscious-
ness. If, for example, it is a temporal extension of 500ms that, all 
10 He calls the first mechanism Stalinesque, in that the experiences our percep-
tual systems produce do not accurately reflect the objective facts—in a manner 
reminiscent of Stalin’s show-trials, and the second mechanism Orwellian, in that 
a false version of recent events is being rewritten, in a manner reminiscent of 
Orwell’s dystopian societies.
11 See for example Dainton 2017.
12 This is Dennett’s position, not mine: I think that the debate between the 
different models is genuine; simply, there are many ways to formulate it. I pres-
ent Dennett’s objection, however, because it gives an interesting insight in what I 
have to say in the following.
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together, is presented by our ocular nerves to our brain—let me say 
consciousness—so that we get to know the motion happened in front 
of us in the last 500ms, we have a direct experience of a temporal ex-
tended atom—and Extentionalists and Retentionalists are right; if, 
on the other hand, what happens is that different atoms—say, snap-
shots taken every 30ms—are presented in succession to our brain, 
we have a direct experience of a snapshot taken in the last 30ms by 
our eyes, and a short-term memory of the preceding snapshots—and 
Cinematists are right. Such a debate, Prosser claims, seems to pre-
suppose the fallacy of the Cartesian Theatre of the mind: the idea 
that there is a place and a moment in which the mere perceptual 
external data become conscious experience—as if a consciousness 
homunculus lived inside our head and watched the data presented to 
him. Besides reasonable worries of an infinite regress, the point is 
that our conscious experience is much more diversified and complex 
than this and, most of all, there isn’t a finish line—a modern pineal 
gland, so to speak.
I agree on this with Dennett and Prosser: there isn’t any fully con-
ceptualised experience, happening at a definite time, as opposed to 
the process of obtaining it; it is the process itself that constitutes our 
experience in its different degrees of consciousness. Our cognition 
of the external world begins in the eye, in the ears, in the fingers; 
there is a process of rising consciousness, of course, but it would be 
vane to look for a precise locus where we come to meet an external 
phenomenon. It is pointless to try to distinguish between the real 
consciousness, the real person, the one that knows and understands, 
and the mere senses and nerves that, like tools and wires, bring in-
formation to the person, and to ask ourselves when the real self come 
to know something, when it is directly perceiving it or only remem-
bering. If the difference between the models, then, consist simply in 
where the finish line should be placed, the non-existence of a finish 
line should deflate the whole debate. There is, of course, a phenom-
enal character associated to our processing of the external input, 
but—as Prosser (2016: 154) puts it—“we need not think that there 
is an answer to the question: ‘when is it like that for the subject?’ […] 
finer-grained questions about what the subject was experiencing at 
some specific time simply have no good answers”.
A real, human experience takes time to be formed. Within this 
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extension of time, it is not clear at all what is a direct perception and 
what a short-term memory; it is not even clear if there is, or should 
be, such a distinction. At which moment a conscious experience ends 
and become a memory? The mathematical description of the present 
as a point on the temporal line should not be confused with our phe-
nomenological present, which consists in a cognitive blend of the last 
apprehended data and—fact that is often underestimated—an antic-
ipation of the future; our understanding of external environment is 
almost totally focused on our capability to intervene on it, or escape 
from it—everything, in our spatial and temporal basic observation 
of the world, is centred on our possibility to act.
This line of thought, however, sheds a new light on the debate 
about the Specious Present. If the dispute is merely about the point 
at which a visual information become a conscious experience and 
then become a memory, there isn’t much hope. But if we intended it, 
instead, as a debate about the experiential ‘here-now’—much nearer 
to our phenomenological and practical life—there is the possibility 
of a new dawn for it. In this case, the debate would be a genuine 
dispute about the best model to account for a certain phenomenal 
intuition, which has even a definite physiological counterpart, as I 
am going to show in the next section.
5 The debate in a new vest
Think of what are our senses, and why we have them; animals are 
the structured organisms that can move. The evolutionary reason of 
the functional and integrated role of our eyes, our ears, our nervous 
system, is to permit us to move in, intervene on or escape from the 
external environment or other animals. Our cognition of space and 
time is not unrelated to this logic; it would be an error to think of 
us as organisms with such and such characteristics, such and such 
temporal and spatial phenomenology, which are then lowered in a 
particular world, as Adam and Eve, shaped in Eden and then fallen 
on Earth. It is the world itself that shaped us and our evolution in 
it—our understanding of it, and the possibility to act, to move, is a 
central part of the project.
The mechanism that underlies our capability to grab objects is 
a perfect example of that. Before the discovery of brain neurons, it 
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was natural to think that when we have an object in front of us—20 
centimetres or 2 metres away—we can decide to take it or not; if we 
decide to take it, our brain tells our arm to move and take it—or, if 
it is too far, tells our body to walk there and our arm to take it. Now-
adays, however, we know that what really happens is much more 
complex;13 there are motor neurons firing for every object in our 
proximity, and an inhibitory mechanism blocking the communica-
tion between them and the nerves; the motor neurons firing are not 
only continuously repeating to the arm how to coordinate to grab the 
object, they are literally telling it to take it; it is only thanks to the 
inhibiting role of the motor cortex—region of the cerebral cortex in 
the frontal lobe—that we don’t actually take every object within our 
reach. Experiments14 with the fMRI demonstrated how, if we move 
the object out of our possibility of reach, the motor neurons stop fir-
ing; of course we can still see the object and think ‘I want to take it’, 
but it is a completely different cognitive action. The curious fact is 
that, if we give the person doing the experiment a stick (with which 
she could reach the object) the neurons start to fire again.
The moral of the story is that our possibility to directly and im-
mediately intervene on the external environment is something that 
makes a great difference for us, it is the way we are built; we have 
senses for that reason. The ‘here-now’, related to our particular pos-
sibilities (how long are our arms, if we carry a stick or not, etc.), 
is central to our way to experience the world. At first glance, we 
could have thought that there isn’t a clear sense in which an object 
is ‘here’; whether it is 20 centimetres or 2 metres far, it is always 
‘here’ in some sense. A debate regarding the exact point at which 
an object is ‘spatially present’ for us would have been meaningless; 
there is not a point at which the object changes its status and becomes 
present, we could have argued. But we are not Adam and Eve, the 
‘spatial here’—intended as ‘what I can directly and immediately act 
on’, ‘what I can reach’—makes a great difference for us, both from 
a neurophysiological and a phenomenological point of view. There 
is an extended spatial ‘here’ clearly distinguished and individuated, 
13 See Rizzolatti et al. 1996, Rizzolatti et al. 2000, Sinigaglia 2008, Sinigaglia 
2008b.
14 See for example Bear et al. 1996.
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and the debate regarding different models trying to describe the 
situation would be meaningful. I think that a similar point could be 
made in the temporal case; before turning to the temporal version 
of this reasoning, however, let me push the argument a little further.
Think of the famous phi phenomenon (the phenomenon of appar-
ent motion). If two immobile spots of light on a screen are turned 
on and off at certain moments (generally the interstimulus interval 
must be around 30 frames per second), we see—instead of the two 
dots—one dot moving; Dainton’s comment is that “evidently our 
brains are more than happy to supply us with experiences of motion 
at the least opportunity” (Dainton 2017b: 1); but why? Again, I think 
that the reason is that we have been built by nature; if we see, in the 
sky or in a field, a black dot disappearing and very briefly another 
black dot appearing 30 centimetres at its left, the best explanation 
of that is that something is moving—and not that the first dot sim-
ply vanished in the sky, while another one miraculously came into 
existence; as Hoerl (2013: 162) puts it, “temporal features of reality 
can enter into the content of perception in the light of the immediate 
implications they possess for actions”; a similar point is also made 
by Morgan (2003: 61): “we are not normally conscious of a blur in 
moving objects: nor do we see them frozen in space-time. Instead, 
we see recognisable objects in motion”. For the same reason, we see 
the leaves of the trees of the same green in the morning and in the 
evening—while, in reality, the two perceived colours are totally dif-
ferent, and mostly not green. All our conscious perceptions contrib-
ute to a successful and homogeneous experience of the world we 
live in; our brain continuously tries to connect every perception to 
familiar experiences, experiences that it knows how to react to, and 
this is why it is so easy to artificially create perceptual illusions in a 
laboratory using vanishing and appearing objects. My point, then, is 
that we can’t think of our experiences without thinking of the way 
we are built; I agree with Hoerl (2013: 168) when he claims that “in 
perception […] features of reality are represented in the light of their 
immediate relevance for the subject’s actions”.
My argument, then, is that the possibility to act on particular 
objects or events is something that makes a great difference for our 
experience of the external world; just as in the spatial case there is 
a distinct sense in which the present is the ‘reachable here’, I believe 
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there are good arguments to claim that in the temporal case ‘the 
present’ is the extension of time in which we can react to what’s 
happening without the sensation that it is already ‘too late’; some 
thought experiments will help me to clarify this point. All the argu-
ments given before, about the complexity and the variegation of our 
temporal experience, stand, but there are also good arguments to 
claim that the dispute could rise again in this new vest.
Consider this example made by Prosser (2017: 154):
Imagine hearing do followed by, say, ten seconds of silence during 
which you continue to think of what you heard, followed by re […]. I 
predict that you will have no difficulty in detecting that the first note 
was followed by a note approximately one tone higher. […] Now imag-
ine the sequence do–re played faster, taking only a fraction of a second. 
Is there any phenomenological difference beyond the fact that the se-
quence takes less time?
Until we look for a phenomenological difference in terms of memo-
ry Vs experience we won’t find one, since it is not possible to clearly 
distinguish these two elements of our cognitive life—since there 
is not a pure experiential datum being presented to the mind. But 
if we, differently, set the debate as concerning the now-here of our 
phenomenological life, it is possible to discern a demarcation, and 
the result—as I am going to show in the following—will favor the 
‘extended present accounts’ of our temporal phenomenology (Re-
tentionalism and Extentionalism), instead of the ‘snapshots ones’ 
(Cinematism or Dynamic Snapshot view); a Specious Present, that is 
to say, seems to be a part of our temporal phenomenology.
Think of the experiment described by Prosser; his conclusion was 
that there wasn’t any clear phenomenological difference, besides the 
platitude that one sequence took more time. Imagine that this time 
the experimenter asks the subject to express a preference, an aes-
thetic judgement for example, between the notes of a piano—“pick 
your favourite note”, could be the assignment. In the first case (the 
note do followed by ten seconds of silence and then a re) the subject 
has the time to react, to consider how much she likes the note do; 
some seconds later she hears the note re and considers it, in turn; ob-
viously enough, it is not particularly difficult for her to acknowledge 
that the second note was higher. But maybe the point is another; 
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when she hears the second note, she has already judged the first one, 
which then feel past. From a phenomenological point of view, there 
is a clear, distinct sense in which the first note is past—the subject 
already reacted to it. In the second example envisaged by Prosser, on 
the contrary (the sequence do–re played faster, taking only a fraction 
of a second), we don’t have the physiological or phenomenological 
temporal space to ‘act’ on the first note and then on the second; of 
course we know that one preceded the other, but in a clear sense we 
are presented with two notes and we have to make two judgements 
in one session. We could even have some difficulty in aesthetically 
judging the two experiences separately (try to do it. You will have 
the clear phenomenological impression that you are asked to judge 
two things all at once). It is legitimate to have different intuitions 
on that, and maybe I represent an exception, but it seems to me that 
there is a very definite sense in which the two notes played in a frac-
tion of a second feel equally present and in which the two notes played 
ten seconds apart don’t.
I take it that William James had in mind something along these 
lines when he spoke, in the Principles, of a ‘duration-block’:
we do not first feel one end and then feel the other after it, and from 
the perception of the succession infer an interval of time between, but 
we seem to feel the interval of time as a whole, with its two ends em-
bedded in it. (James 1890: 610)
In this context it is possible to recover Dainton’s intuition of a ‘co-
conscious present’, a temporal extension that allow us to have only 
one reaction. Realizing to having heard two close sounds is some-
thing different from realizing to having heard one sound and nine 
seconds later realizing to having heard another sound, one tone 
higher. Co-consciousness, then, would be defined by the ratio be-
tween the temporal distance of the two sounds and our capability 
to react (in this case, judge them). The rate would define then an 
extended now, just as in the spatial case the length of our arms and 
the distance of the object (which together determine our possibility 
to reach something) define our extended here.
A new grasp on the concept of co-consciousness would be thus 
reached. Two very close sounds are co-conscious, in this sense, 
because we can have only one reaction. We don’t have the time to 
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notice that there has been a sound, and then another one; we have an 
experience of two close sounds. When there are many close sounds 
going on for many seconds, instead—for example, think of a piano 
song—what we do is finding a rhythm of many extended presents. 
Of course we can generate cases in which it is difficult to distinguish 
between one experience of two sounds or two distinct experiences, 
but I don’t see it as a troublesome problem. Most of the times, there 
is a clear phenomenological sense in which something is present or 
here in this specified sense; I take it to be a promising approach to 
understand what the Specious Present is. It is always possible, strict-
ly speaking, to break down an experience and arrive at an atomic 
snapshot, but this is not what we have in mind when we think of 
an analysis of our temporal experience; we look for a model that is 
capable to translate phenomenological differences, instead of merely 
chronometric. When the Extentionalist claims that our present ex-
perience is extended, she has—or should have—in mind a notion of 
co-consciousness as now described. It is now the Cinematists (Static 
or Dynamic) that should explain in which sense our experience is 
point-like.
The question of whether our temporal experience has a tempo-
rally extended content should be rejected, rather than answered, 
only if we think of it as the search of a definite moment at which 
information ‘enters’ or ‘leaves’ consciousness, or at which conscious 
experience starts and ends; if we, instead, consider the temporal 
content of our experience as the now with which we have a particu-
lar interactive role, just as the spatial here that our motor neurons 
are so good at individuating, then the question becomes interesting 
again. We could ask which is the extension of our present temporal 
experience just as we can ask which is the extension of our reachable 
here; in this case, some sort of Specious Present seems an indispens-
able element of our temporal phenomenology. It is only after such a 
philosophical analysis that a neurophysiologist can define the nature 
of the Specious Present and measure its duration.
6 The role of anticipation and a counterargument answered
Finally, I want to stress the (often neglected) role of anticipation in 
the picture. The arguments about the phenomenological present 
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usually concern our sensations, short-term memory and long-term 
memory. However, even the anticipation of the near-to-come future 
has an important role in the definition of our temporal present win-
dow; let me make an example, before turning to some experimental 
data. It is exactly talking of action and reaction that the role of an-
ticipation came to the surface in such a strong way: not only, in fact, 
we react to something that we have seen, or touched, or smelled—
that is gone, happened, in the past—, but we also act according to 
what we want to do in the future. It is only keeping in mind the 
combination of these two elements, past and future, reaction and 
action, that we can understand the window of the present, and not 
only because they always coexist in that window, but even and more 
significantly because one influence the other, as some very interest-
ing experimental results confirm. One that I find significant, in this 
context, and that stresses the role of anticipation in our temporal 
experience of the present, is the phenomenon described by psycholo-
gists as backward masking: when, for example, we listen to music, 
the phenomenal character of our experience of a note is affected by 
the properties of the notes immediately prior to that note and after 
that note. Laurie Paul (2014: 186) comments:
How can we ‘see into the future’ in this way? What is the basis for this 
experience of foreshadowing? There is debate about the mechanism in-
volved in the cognitive processing of these temporally clustered events. 
Some have argued that it is a predictive effect […]. Others have argued 
that it is what is called a ‘postdictive effect’ […]. What matters here 
is that these foreshadowing and filling-in psychological effects are em-
pirically well-documented, even if their source is not fully understood. 
What I find particularly meaningful, in this context, is that this 
backward masking effect obtains only when the stimuli are close to 
one another; I see it as an experimental confirmation of the fact that 
there is indeed a phenomenological difference in the two sequences 
of notes ‘do-re’ beyond the mere fact that one sequence takes less 
time. When two notes are experienced in the same Specious Pres-
ent, we have one reaction to two sounds—the second sound could 
even affect the phenomenal character of the first one, while the same 
thing does not happen when two sounds are more temporally sepa-
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rated. A similar reasoning can be extended to the other senses.15
At this point, however, it is very easy to see a possible counterar-
gument. If we don’t specify the length of the specious present, it can 
be argued, we haven’t actually brought about any kind of improve-
ment to the debate. A stronger version of this argument could be that 
if we don’t specify the length of the specious present, we don’t even 
have arguments to maintain its existence, not even from a phenom-
enological point of view; affirmanti incumbit probatio, it could be said. 
If we are interested in maintaining the importance of the specious 
present, we should be prepared to answer the very reasonable wor-
ries about its extension. If the specious present is our phenomeno-
logical window of presentness, how extended is that window? Is it 
something that should be decided by a phenomenological investiga-
tion, or is it the field of neurophysiological studies? I see the difficulty 
here, but I do not think it actually is a counterargument to what I am 
proposing, which is merely a change of perspective. A lot of experi-
mental work should be done on this topic, and something more pre-
cise about the extendedness of that window could be said. My point, 
however, was that the important thing to understand here is that the 
experiments should not be conducted in the belief that we are going 
to discover the border between present consciousness and memory; 
instead of focusing on what particular cognitive acts are going on in 
our mind, the experimenters should focus on our possibility to act 
and react. My intuition is that the results (the extendedness of the 
specious present) will vary depending on the particular task set by 
the experimenters, but I don’t see it as a problem. It is quite natural 
to think that the window of our phenomenal presence has a differ-
ent extension depending on what we are doing or trying to do. The 
important point, in my opinion, is that once we have absorbed this 
change of perspective there is a definite way to decide if a Specious 
Present is part of our temporal phenomenology, to understand what 
it is, to measure what is its duration in a particular situation, and to 
decide which models of our temporal understanding are more apt to 
describe our phenomenal temporality. Conclusions In the first sec-
tion, I have presented James’ idea of a present which is specious in 
15 See for example Saccuzzo et al. 1996, Herzog et al. 2013 for the studies of 
visual backward masking in schizophrenic patients.
Andrea Roselli138
that, unlike the mathematical conception of the present as a point 
on the temporal line, it is an interval and not a durationless instant; 
what this Specious Present is meant to capture is our phenomeno-
logical present, a duration which is perceived both as present and as 
temporally extended. In the second section, I have tried to clarify 
the differences between the various phenomenological presents that 
different authors may have in mind; in contemporary literature, the 
most wide-spread interpretation is the phenomenological immedia-
cy associated with our complex perceptions. Finally, I have clarified 
that what I am proposing here is a model capable of establishing a 
definite meaning for this phenomenological immediacy. In the third 
section, I have presented the main models of our temporal phenom-
enology and showed how the Specious Present appears in them; ev-
ery model has a story to tell about our phenomenological immediacy 
and it seems that—if we reject the change of perspective I propose 
here—we don’t have a way to choose. In the fourth section, I have 
argued that if the difference between the models simply concerns 
the point at which external data become conscious—where to put 
the line between memory and present consciousness—there is not 
much hope for the debate, since it seems to rely on the fallacy of the 
Cartesian theatre of the mind. In the fifth section, I have proposed 
the change of perspective which is the object of the present paper: 
if we intend the dispute between the models as regarding the ex-
periential ‘here-now’—much nearer to our phenomenological and 
practical life—there is the possibility of a new dawn for it. Realizing 
to having heard two close sounds is something different from real-
izing to having heard one sound and many seconds later realizing 
to having heard another sound, one tone higher. Co-consciousness, 
then, would be defined by the ratio between the temporal distance 
of the two sounds and our capability to react (in my example, judge 
them). The rate would define then an extended now, just as in the 
spatial case I presented the length of our arms and the distance of an 
object define our extended here. In the sixth and final section, I have 
stressed the role of anticipation in our phenomenal temporality—
something which, again, points in the direction of an active role of 
the window of presentness—, and I considered a possible counter-
argument: if we don’t specify how extended is that window, it could 
be said, we haven’t actually brought about any kind of improvement 
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to the debate. I have argued that, even if a lot of experimental work 
should be done on this topic, my point was merely that the experi-
ments should not be conducted in the belief that we are going to 
discover the border between present consciousness and memory; 
instead of focusing on what particular cognitive acts are going on in 
our mind, the experimenters should focus on our possibility to act 
and react. My intuition is that the results (the extendedness of the 
specious present) will vary depending on the particular task set by 
the experimenters; it is quite natural, after all, to think that the win-
dow of our phenomenal presence has a different extension depending 
on what we are doing or trying to do.
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